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Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 10:
Fortified Town (Burgward) Strategy Implemented in Tamaulipas
Via Mexico Inaugurates Military Barracks in Violence-Plagued Town. Borderland Beat. Saturday 10 
December 2011:
Mexican President Felipe Calderon formally inaugurated a military barracks in the violence-racked 
northeastern town of Ciudad Mier, where he reiterated that the deployment of army soldiers to 
battle drug-trafficking gangs is a necessary but temporary measure.
He said the new army base will allow time for authorities to recruit and form their own police 
forces in that town and other areas of Tamaulipas state, saying that the weakness, vulnerability 
and, in some cases, complicity, of law enforcement had put people at the mercy of criminals.
Calderon said Ciudad Mier, a colonial community in Tamaulipas state near the U.S.-Mexico 
border that was once known as the Magic Town, should be a tourist destination but instead was 
abandoned by its citizens last year because of the presence of criminal gangs.
In late 2010, nearly all of the towns 6,300 inhabitants fled to neighboring municipalities and 
across the border into the United States due to fear of drug-related violence.
Many of them had relocated to a shelter in the nearby city of Ciudad Miguel Aleman.
Ciudad Mier, which is located in the Frontera Chica region of Tamaulipas, and many other 
towns in northeastern Mexico found themselves caught up in the war sparked by the March 2010 
rupture of the alliance between the Gulf drug cartel and Los Zetas, the cartels former armed wing.
The shootouts between gunmen working for the rival cartels occurred for about six months and 
sometimes lasted as long as eight hours, leaving the streets covered with bullet casings.
In a bid to boost security, the Defense Secretariat ordered the construction of a mobile military 
barracks to house soldiers deployed to Ciudad Mier, a move Calderon said prompted the return of 
two thirds of the people who had fled the town.
Ciudad Mier had started to become a community of empty squares, abandoned houses, of 
shuttered schools and businesses, of bullet-ridden walls. Faced with that situation, the government 
couldnt remain with its arms crossed, Calderon said.
The presence of the army soldiers, who arrived in the second half of 2011, is gradually helping 
the people of Ciudad Mier and all of Tamaulipas regain the tranquility that had been snatched 
away from them by the criminals, Calderon said.
He said homicides fell by more than 40 percent between the first and second halves of 2011, 
although he also acknowledged that the road is long and much work still remains.
The mobile military barracks, which the president formally inaugurated on Thursday, are capable 
of housing 600 troops.
The installations are the first of their type in the country, the Defense Secretariat said, noting that 
the materials used allow them to be taken down easily and moved to other areas as necessary.
The barracks, which occupy an area of 40 hectares (100 acres), respond to the need for mobile 
units capable of reacting to the contingencies that may arise in Tamaulipas state.
Source: EFE [1].
Analysis: This is a key new (and underappreciated) strategic component in the Mexican governments 
response to the criminal insurgencies taking place in that country. The Mexican federal government is 
implementing a prototype program to reestablish its authority in the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico overrun 
by the cartels and gangs. Specifically, it is garrisoning an Army unit in a 100 acre modular base in close 
proximity to the abandoned town of Ciudad Mier. Ciudad Mier had been abandoned in late 2010, with 
most of its 6,300 residents becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs), due to the conflict raging 
between the Zetas and Gulf cartels. The establishment of the Army garrison (battalion size/600 soldiers) 
resulted in about two-thirds of the residents of Ciudad Mier returning back to the town.
The intent of the fortified town prototype in Ciudad Mier is to create an island of Federal authority and 
stability that can then be expanded to retake the surrounding lands that have been lost (what the Mexican 
government terms areas of impunity). This will be undertaken by the creation of new vetted (and 
uncorrupted) police forces that will then be established in nearby communities. It is assumed that the 
Ciudad Mier garrison will patrol the countryside in its area of responsibility (AOR) and function as a rapid 
deployment force that can then come to the aid of these new police forces when they are threatened by 
larger cartel commando units. No mention has been made of civilian defense forces (militias) being 
formed in support of the military garrison and police units though such potentials exist and the creation 
of those units would have many benefits.
The fortified town strategy is being gradually expanded by the Calderon administration in selected r gions 
of Mexico that have been lost to de facto cartel and gang political authority:
A second army base is being built in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, where 72 migrants, the majority 
of them from Central America, were massacred by Zetas in August 2010, and a third base is under 
construction in Ciudad Mante, another strife-torn part of the state [2].
The intent is to build supporting towns to Ciudad Mier that could be utilized to create their own zones of 
Federal control, mutually support each other, and, as a system of internal defenses, regain control of 
regions of Tamaulipas via their own battalion sized Army garrisons and subordinated police forces (See 
Fig. 1).
Of interest is how the fortified town strategy overlaps with Mexicos growing internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) issue. This may become a primary Federal strategy to help mitigate it [3].  Also the establishment 
of such towns ties into very recent Feral cities analysis which discusses 4th (Purple) and 5th (Black) level 
cities (fully feral/dead cities and criminalized cities, respectively). This promotes the perspective that dead 
cities can be recolonized by the state and come back as 1st (Green) or 2nd (Yellow) level cites under its 
authority [4]. Finally, it is expected that the fortified town strategy will eventually be utilized in tandem by 
the Mexican federal government with some sort of retaking of the slums strategy in the major cities. Such 
a strategy was recently articulated by Vanda Felbab-Brown, though not specifically focused upon the 
criminal insurgencies taking place in Mexico [5].
Grand Strategic Analysis: In essence, fortified towns (garrison towns) are being established by means of 
recolonizing (and stabilizing existing populations) in a region of Mexico lost to the de facto rule of the 
criminal insurgents. This is pretty much an unheard of development with regard to mature, stable, and 
modern states. Rather, it is characteristic of centralized states expanding into frontier areas (those 
expanding territorially) and such states losing control over expanses of their lands (those being overrun by 
raiders and barbarians). This is very much reminiscent of Roman, and later Holy Roman, Empire frontier 
towns (burgwards et.al.) in Europe during the late imperial and post-Western empire eras. The raiders of 
those eras, however, were early on based on the Germanic tribes and Huns (Magyars) as opposed to 
todays cartel (2nd/3rd phase) and gang (3GEN) groupings [6]. Modern parallels to US firebases in 
Vietnam may be made but the context and type of insurgency (criminal vs Maoist-inspired) make such 
contentions highly problematic. The historical parallels to the criminal-soldier threats of the late Roman 
Empire and Dark Ages appear even more viable in light of the multitude of atrocities committed (torture, 
mutilations, and beheadings), although in this instance with a post-modern contextual overlay.
Note(s):
Figure 1. Federal Mexican Burward Strategy is not to geographic scale. It is a notional figure of how this 
new strategy may be conceptualized. Military and police unit symbols will vary. While both Mexican 
Army and OPFOR units have motorized (& mechanized) capabilities the standard infantry symbol is 
being utilized for these groups.
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